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CAN A CORPORATION COMMIT MURDER?
On June 14, 1985, an Illinois corporation, Film Recovery Systems, was
convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the cyanide-poisoning death of
a corporate employee.' The small suburban Chicago company used large
vats containing cyanide to extract silver from x-ray and photographic
film. Film Recovery's employees, mostly aliens unable to speak or read
English, worked over unvented vats without proper safety equipment.
On February 10, 1985, after several employees complained of symptoms
associated with cyanide poisoning, Stephan Golab, a 61-year-old Polish
worker, collapsed and died.2
The Film Recovery case marks a new trend in corporate homicide
prosecutions. Prosecutors are more willing to charge corporations and
their officers for homicides.3 Since Film Recovery, a corporation has even
1. Illinois v. Film Recovery Sys., Nos. 83-1109 and 84-5064, see Spiegel, The Liability of Cor-
porate Officers, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1985, at 48. Film Recovery Systems and a sister company, Metallic
Mining Systems, were convicted of involuntary manslaughter under ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38, §9-3
(1985) for unintentionally killing an individual by recklessly performing acts "likely to cause death
or great bodily harm." Three officers of Film Recovery Systems were convicted of murder under
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38, §9-1 (1985) by performing acts they knew created "a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm" to an individual. The individuals and both corporations were also
convicted of reckless endangerment of their employees' lives. See Spiegel, supra, at 48.
2. Spiegel, supra note 1, at 48. After a medical examiner established cyanide as the cause of
death, investigators toured the plant and found numerous health and safety violations. Id. Judge
Ronald Banks found that corporate officials knew of the dangers of cyanide, and the workers' symp-
toms, but failed to take safety precautions. Banks sentenced each of the individual defendants to
concurrent terms of 25 years for murder and one year for each reckless endangerment count. Each
individual was ordered to pay a $10,000 fine and the two corporations were fined a total of $48,000.
All convictions are being appealed. Id. at 50.
3. Investigations to determine whether to file criminal charges against the corporation for
employee deaths have been conducted in Massachusetts, New Mexico and California. See Bus. WK.,
Feb. 10, 1986, at 73. This new trend in corporate homicide prosecutions has also brought more
criminal charges against individuals for corporate misconduct. See, eg., Spiegel, supra note 1, at 50
(film director John Landis and members of his production crew have been charged with manslaugh-
ter for the deaths of actor Vic Morrow and two children during the filming of a helicopter scene for
the movie Twilight Zone); N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1985, at 13, col. 1 (the owner and various supervisory
personnel of Autumn Hills Convalescent Centers, were all charged with murder in the death of a
patient).
This Note, however, discusses the criminal liability of individual officers only to the extent that
such liability affects an analysis of the criminal liability of corporations. Criminal liability of individ-
ual officers for corporate crime is not particularly controversial. See Overland Cotton Mill Co. v.
People, 32 Colo. 263, 269, 75 P. 924, 926 (1904) ("[A]n officer of a corporation, through whose act
the corporation commits an offense against the laws of the state, is himself also guilty of the same
offense.") Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability, 40 Bus. LAW. 129, 138-39 (1984) ("[a] corporate
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gone on trial for murder.4 Clearly, the attitude toward corporate ac-
countability for homicide is changing, but many state statutes still insu-
late corporations from prosecution.
This Note examines the statutory and judicial treatment of corporate
homicide liability and asserts that corporations should be made amenable
to murder prosecutions in appropriate cases. Part I traces the history of
corporate criminal liability for homicide in America. Part II reviews the
policy reasons for imposing criminal liability for all homicide offenses on
corporations. Part III contains recommendations to state legislatures for
formulating homicide statutes to include corporations.
I. HISTORY
A. Pre-Twentieth Century Limits On Corporate Criminal
Accountability
Early common law authorities held that a corporation could not com-
mit any crime.' As corporations increased in number and size, however,
the old common-law notion changed. By the mid-nineteenth century,
courts established the general rule that a corporation may be criminally
liable for crimes which an agent commits on the corporation's behalf.6 A
agent may not use the corporate entity as a shield against personal liability for his own misdeeds"
[citation omitted]).
4. See N.Y. Times, supra note 3, at 13, col. 1. Autumn Hills Convalescent Centers, a Hous-
ton-based corporation that runs nursing homes, was charged with murdering an 87-year-old patient
by neglect.
5. This proposition is most frequently traced to the statement by Lord Holt, C.J., that "[a]
corporation is not indictable, although the particular members of it are." Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep.
1518 (K.B. 1701). See also W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *476: "A corporation cannot commit
treason, or felony, or other crime in its corporate capacity, though its members may in their distinct
individual capacities." See generally I K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (1984) (trac-
ing the common law development of corporate criminal liability).
6. See, eg., State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.LL. 360 (1852). In Morris & Essex R.R., the
company was charged with nuisance for blocking a public highway. The court reasoned that be-
cause a corporation is civilly liable for the torts of its agents acting within the scope of their employ-
ment, the same doctrine could be applied to make the corporation criminally liable. Id. at 368-69.
Most of the early twentieth century cases continued to draw on principles of agency and tort law
to impose criminal liability on corporations. Generally, courts held that as long as the agent was
acting within the general scope of his authority and for the benefit of the corporation, the acts of the
agent can be imputed to the corporation. See, e.g., New York Cent. & H.R.R. v. United States, 212
U.S. 481, 494 (1909); Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn. 618, 670, 100 S.W. 705, 718 (1906).
Moreover, the act may be imputed even if the corporation specifically prohibits the agent from vio-
lating the law. See Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263-68, 69, 75 P. 924, 926. But ef
MODEL PENAL CODE §2.07(5) (1962) ("it shall be a defense if the defendant corporation proves by a
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corporation could be indicted for acts of nonfeasance or misfeasance.7
Furthermore, a corporation could not immunize itself from prosecution
by claiming the criminal acts were ultra vires.8
Even after corporate criminal liability became a generally accepted
principle, courts hesitated to convict corporations of crimes requiring a
specific criminal intent. In Commonwealth v. Punxsutawney St. Passen-
ger Ry. ,' a manslaughter case, a Pennsylvania court rejected the conten-
tion that a corporation could formulate malice or criminal intent and
refused to impute the malice or criminal intent of an agent to the
corporation. o
preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the
subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission").
Not all writers agree which agents may subject the corporation to criminal liability. However,
most confirm that officers and high managerial agents who commit criminal acts within the scope of
their employment can subject the corporation to liability. See, ag., Elkins, Corporations and the
Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73, 100-03 (1976); cf Mueller, Mens Rea and the
Corporation, 19 U. PrIr. L. Rnv. 21, 47 (1957) (if the utility of corporate criminal liability for the
cnmes authorized by the board of directors is assumed, then the extension of vicarious liability to the
other high managerial agents is proper). Authorities tend to disagree, however, whether a corpora-
tion should be held criminally liable for the crimes of subordinate employees. See, eg., Brickey,
supra note 3, at 131 ("[a] corporation may be held liable for the acts of its agents without regard to
their status in the corporate hierarchy" [citations omitted]); Mueller, supra, at 41 (objecting to the
extension of corporate criminal liability to acts of subordinate employees on the grounds that only
the "inner-circle"-officers and high managerial agents--can act and think for the corporation);
Elkins, supra, at 126 (concluding that "the title or position of the employee or agent should not be
determinative for imputing criminal responsibility to the corporation").
7. Nonfeasance is a "neglect of duty" while misfeasance requires "a direct and positive act."
See State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. at 366-69 (abolishing the rule that a corporation is
criminally liable only for acts of nonfeasance but not for acts of misfeasance). Accord United States
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 835 (1906) (a corporation may be indicted for nonfea-
sance and for "such deeds of misfeasance as are complete by the mere doing of the thing prohib-
ited"); People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 104, 88 N.E. 22, 23 (1909) (a corporation
may be indicted for nonfeasance if it is "capable of doing the act for nonperformance of which it is
charged," and it may be indicted for misfeasance if the act is not "clearly and totally beyond its
authorized powers").
8. See State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. at 369. Accord United States v. Mirror Lake
Golf & Country Club, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 167, 172 (1964); State ex rel. Losey v. Willard, 54 So. 2d
183, 184 (Fla. 1951). An act is ultra vires when it transcends the scope of powers of the corporation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (5th ed. 1979).
9. 24 Pa. C. 25 (1900).
10 Id. at 26. The court also held that manslaughter is so far ultra vires that it could not be
considered an act of the corporation. Id. See also State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. at 370.
The court said that a corporation could not be indicted for crimes requiring "a corrupt intent or
malus animus" or for "other crimes, as treason and murder, for which the punishment imposed by
law cannot be inflicted upon a corporation." The argument that corporations were exempt from
prosecution for felonies such as murder because they could not be punished corporally was met with
early criticism. See Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and Observation, 60
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By the turn of the century, courts began to impute the specific intent of
agents to their corporations for crimes other than homicide. In the lead-
ing case, Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth," a Massachusetts
court held that a corporation was subject to punishment for criminal
contempt. 12 The court found it no more difficult to impute specific intent
in a criminal proceeding than in a civil action."t Furthermore, because
the corporation's property could be taken as punishment for a public
wrong as easily as it could be taken as compensation for a private
wrong,14 the corporation's inability to be arrested or imprisoned was not
an obstacle to criminal liability. Soon thereafter, corporations were held
accountable for other specific intent crimes such as larceny,' 5 conspir-
acy,16 and the illegal practice of law.' 7
Even though corporate accountability for specific intent crimes in-
creased during the early part of the twentieth century, corporations were
not charged with homicides requiring a specific intent. Nevertheless,
courts began holding corporations liable for homicides resting on negli-
gence. In United States v. Van Schaick,18 officers of a steamship com-
pany were charged with aiding and abetting the corporation in
committing manslaughter by failing to equip the steamship with satisfac-
tory life preservers as required by statute. 9 A fire which sank the steam-
ship resulted in 900 deaths.20 The officers argued that they could not be
charged as accessories of a corporation in the commission of manslaugh-
ter because a corporation could not be indicted for such a crime. The
WASH. U.L.Q. 393, 410 n.99 (1982) (citing 1 J. BISHOP COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 506 (3rd ed. 1865)): "A corporation cannot be hung: yet there is no reason why it may not be
fined, or suffer the loss of its franchise, for the same act which would subject an individual to the
gallows.").
11. 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.E. 445 (1899).
12. Id. at 297, 52 N.E. at 446. The corporate defendant was a newspaper that had published an
article concerning an ongoing trial. A lower court found that the article was calculated to obstruct
justice and prevent a fair trial. Id. at 295, 52 N.E. at 445.
13. Izd at 297, 52 N.E. at 446 (The court noted that specific intent could be imputed to a
newspaper in a civil action for libel.).
14. Id.
15. See, eg., People v. Canadian Fur Trappers' Corp., 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E. 455 (1928).
16. Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 F. 926 (8th Cir. 1914), aff'd, 236 U.S. 531
(1915).
17. People v. California Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App. 354, 244 P. 1089 (1926).
18. 134 F. 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904).
19. Id. at 596-97. Another statute provided that an owner was guilty of manslaughter if his
misconduct or violation of law destroyed the life of any person. Id. at 594.




court, however, rejected the argument on the grounds that the offense
was the result of a statutory violation and no malice or intent to kill was
necessary.2'
In State v. Lehigh Valley Railroad 22 a New Jersey court denied a cor-
poration's motion to quash an indictment against it for involuntary man-
slaughter. The court said that a corporation can be criminally liable for
its acts unless there is something in the nature or essential ingredients of
the crime, or the character of the punishment which makes it impossible
to hold the corporation liable.23 In holding that involuntary manslaugh-
ter does not come within any of these exceptions,24 the Lehigh Valley
court became the first state court to uphold the indictment of a corpora-
tion for criminal homicide.25
Even as courts advocated the seemingly irreconcilable positions of im-
puting specific intent in non-homicide cases but only subjecting corpora-
tions to prosecution for homicides based on negligence, a few courts, in
dicta, indicated their willingness to impute specific intent if the homicide
statutes were written to include corporations. In People v. Rochester
Railway & Light Co.26 a corporation was accused of negligently installing
water-heating equipment in a home so that fumes escaped and killed a
resident. The court said that, although the corporation could not be
guilty of manslaughter under the existing statutory definition of the
crime, the legislature could formulate a manslaughter statute which
would apply to a corporation.27 The court also noted that a corporation
21. Id. at 602.
22. 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917).
23. Id. at 373, 103 A. at 685-86.
24. The court held that the corporation could be punished because the applicable statute pre-
scribed imprisonment or afine, or both. Id. at 374, 103 A. at 686. Likewise, the court rejected the
corporation's argument that the essential ingredients of manslaughter, as defined by some of the "old
authorities" of common law, required the killing of one human being by another human being. The
court noted that Blackstone's definition of homiide--"the killing of a human creature.., without
justification or excuse"--did not exclude corporations from criminal responsibility. Id. at 375, 103
A. at 686 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES*188). Finally, the court, citing State v. Mor-
ris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360 (1852), said that perjury was the type of crime a corporation could
not commit, but did not explain what "in the nature of the crime" of pejury mandated this conclu-
sion, or why involuntary manslaughter was distinguishable. 90 N.J.L. at 373, 103 A. at 685-86.
25. The Van Schaick case was brought in federal court under a federal statute. See supra notes
18-21 and accompanying text.
26. 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909).
27. Id. at 107, 88 N.E. at 24. The applicable statute defined homicide as "the killing of one
human being by the act, procurement or omission of another." Id. The state argued that "another"
should be interpreted as another "person" which includes corporations. The court, however, de-
cided that "another" referred to another "human being." Id.
Number 3]
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may be liable for a crime requiring specific intent.28 Taken together, the
two statements indicate that, under an appropriate statute, the court
would have held a corporation criminally liable for a homicide requiring
specific intent.29
C. Statutory Language and Recent Judicial Interpretation
Despite courts' willingness to hold a corporation criminally accounta-
ble for homicide, corporations still avoid criminal accountability because
of narrowly written, vague and ambiguous homicide statutes.30 Courts,
hesitant to uphold homicide indictments against corporations without
strong precedent, 3I have looked to the express statutory language, legisla-
tive history, and applicable punishments to discern whether the legisla-
28. IdL at 106, 88 N.E. at 23 (citing Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass.
294, 52 N.E. 445 (1899)). See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
29. See also in United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823 (1906), an action charg-
ing a corporation with conspiracy in restraint of trade. While dispensing with the argument that a
corporation is incapable of committing a specific intent crime like conspiracy, the court said it is "as
easy and logical to ascribe to a corporation an evil mind as it is to impute to it a sense of contractual
obligation." Id. at 836. The court maintained that the only limits on holding a corporation account-
able for specific intent crimes like "homicide or larceny" is the "impossibility of visiting upon corpo-
rations the punishments usually prescribed." Id. The court concluded by saying "[t]he same law
that creates the corporation may create the crime, and to assert that the Legislature cannot punish
its own creature because it cannot make a creature capable of violating the law does not.., bear
discussion." Id. If the legislature may create the crime, surely it can also create a punishment
suitable for a corporation.
30. See, eg., Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), In
Vaughan & Sons, a Texas corporation was convicted of criminally negligent homicide in the death of
two persons in a motor vehicle collision. On appeal, the conviction was reversed and the case dis-
missed on the grounds that the Texas Penal Code did not make corporations liable for any degree of
homicide. Id. at 679.
The Texas Penal Code provides that criminally negligent homicide occurs when "[a] person ...
causes the death of an individual by criminal negligence." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.07(a)
(Vernon 1974). In addition, a corporation is criminally responsible for the conduct of its agents
acting within the scope of employment. Id. at § 7.22(a). While the definition of "person" includes a
corporation, id. at § 1.07(a)(27), an "individual" is defined as a human being who has been born and
is alive, id. at § 1.07(a)(17).
The Vaughan & Sons court conceded that a "superficial" reading of these statutes indicated that a
corporation "could" be found guilty of negligent homicide. 649 S.W.2d at 678. Nevertheless, the
court "declined" to hold corporations criminally responsible for homicide "without a stronger,
clearer indication from the legislature." Id. at 679.
31. A lack of precedent, binding or persuasive, lay beneath the Vaughan court's decision. See
supra note 30. The court noted that Vaughan & Sons, Inc. was the first corporation to appeal its
homicide conviction under the existing Penal Code. The court also looked to other states and found
that "those... which have addressed the issue are divided as to criminal responsibility for personal
crimes such as homicide and rape." 649 S.W.2d at 677.
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ture intended to make corporations criminally liable for homicide.32
Early homicide statutes were often based on the common law defini-
tion of homicide which required that the act be committed by "a per-
son."33  Consequently, in State v. Pacific Powder Co. 31 the Oregon
Supreme Court refused to hold a corporation criminally accountable for
manslaughter. The court reasoned that, by enacting the common law
definition of homicide, the legislature considered only human actors ca-
pable of the crime.35 Although the Oregon Penal Code followed the com-
mon law definition of homicide,36 it further defined the word "person" to
include corporations "unless the context requires otherwise.",37 The Pa-
cific Powder court concluded that, in the instance, the "context" required
the word "person" to mean something other than its statutory defini-
tion-it was limited to human beings.38
In many homicide statutes the word "person" refers to the slayer or
the victim, or both. Often "person" is defined in the state penal code to
include a corporation. As in Pacific Powder such a definition may be
susceptible to judicial interpretation. For instance, in People v. Ebasco
Services, Inc. ,39 a New York court was faced with a negligent homicide
statute that used the word "person" when referring to both the slayer
32. See, eg., Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3
(1983) (statutory language, provisions for corporate punishment and the absence of contrary author-
ity in the California code commissioner's notes all indicated that a corporation can be prosecuted for
manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 943 (Ky. App. 1981) (language
and commentary to new corporate liability statute clearly expressed the legislative intent to hold
corporations criminally liable); State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530 (1961) (use of
the word "person" in manslaughter statute and mandatory penalty of imprisonment and a fine, indi-
cated a legislative intent not to make corporations criminally accountable for manslaughter); Com-
monwealth v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459 (1913) (dismissing manslaughter
indictment in part because the only punishment recognized was death or imprisonment).
33. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.040(2) (1954) which provided that "(2) Anyperson who, in
the commission of... a lawful act without due caution or circumspection, involuntary kills another,
is guilty of manslaughter." (emphasis supplied).
34. State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530 (1961).
35. Id. at 507-08, 360 P.2d at 532.
36. See supra note 33.
37. Id. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.010 (1967) provided that "As used in the statutes relating to
crimes and criminal procedure, unless the context requires otherwise: ...
(11) 'Person' includes corporations as well as natural persons ......
38. 226 Or. at 507, 360 P.2d at 532. The court also relied on the statutory punishment pre-
scribed for the offense to support its conclusion that the context required "person" to mean "human
being." The mandatory penalty for manslaughter included imprisonment, which cannot be imposed
on a corporation. Id. Oregon has since revised its criminal law to eliminate all reference to the
commission of the act by a "person." See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.118 and 163.125 (1985).
39. 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1974).
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and the victim, but defined "person" in the homicide article solely in
terms of the victim." A broader definition of "person" contained in the
Penal Law's general definitional article provided that" '[pierson-means
a human being, and where appropriate, a... corporation. '41  Unlike the
Pacific Powder court42 the Ebasco Services court did not use the "where
appropriate" language to immunize the corporation from prosecution.
The court held that New York law allowed corporations to be prosecuted
for homicide.43
The homicide statute which most clearly includes corporations is
found in the California Penal Code. The California Penal Code defines
manslaughter as "the unlawful killing of a human being without mal-
ice"'  while other states' statutes define manslaughter as the killing "of a
human being.., by another."45 In Granite Construction Co. v. Superior
Court,46 the California Court of Appeals held that corporations may be
prosecuted for manslaughter under the California manslaughter stat-
ute.47 The court also found support for its holding in Section 26 of the
Penal Code which provides that "any person is capable of committing
crimes except children, idiots and those lacking mens rea through mis-
take of fact, etcetera," 48 and section seven which defines "person" to in-
clude a corporation.49 Finally, the absence of any "contrary expression"
40. The statute provides that "A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with
criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (MeKin-
ney 1975) (italics added). The Penal law further provided that a "[pierson, when referring to the
victim of a homicide, means a human being who has been born and is alive." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.05(1) (McKinney 1975) (italics added).
41. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(7) (McKinney 1975).
42. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
43. 77 Misc. 2d at 787, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 811. Even though the court concluded that a corpora-
tion could be held accountable under its existing homicide statutes, it dismissed the indictment as
defective because of a failure to particularize sufficiently the facts as required by statute. Id. at 788,
354 N.Y.S.2d at 812. In Granite Construction Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), the court noted that the Ebasco court could "easily" have prevented
the prosecution of corporations through the "where appropriate" language, "particularly in light of
the 'killing by another' language in New York's manslaughter definition." Id. at 473, 197 Cal. Rptr.
at 8.
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (Deering 1985).
45. 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1983).
46. Id. at 467, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 4. The corporation was indicted for manslaughter in the death
of seven construction workers.
47. Id. at 467, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 5 (reviewing statutes from New York, Oregon, Kentucky,
Texas, and Pennsylvania).
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (Deering 1985).
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (Deering 1985). The corporation in Granite Construction argued
that the very absence of the word "person" in § 192 indicated the statute was not intended to reach
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in the code commissioners' notes encouraged the court to follow the clear
language of the statute which makes corporations responsible for crimes
against persons.50
Courts also consider the penalties prescribed for homicide to deter-
mine whether a corporation can be prosecuted. The fact that a corpora-
tion cannot be subjected to usual punishments, such as death or
imprisonment, often is used to illustrate the futility of a corporate homi-
cide prosecution. 5' However, when punishment is either a fine or impris-
onment, or both, a corporation is not necessarily immune from
prosecution.52 Similarly, when the statute provides for imprisonment if
the fine imposed is not paid, the corporation may be liable. 3 Finally, if a
statute creates the offense but provides no punishment, a court may im-
pose the common law punishment of a fine. 4
The California Penal Code provides another obvious solution to the
punishment problem.
Under section 193, the ordinary punishment prescribed for man-
slaughter is imprisonment.55 Section 672, however, provides that a court
corporations. The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, it said that § 192 merely
defined the crime while §§ 7 and 26 defined the scope of application. 149 Cal. App. 3d at 468, 197
Cal. Rptr. at 5. Second, the court noted that acceptance of the corporation's argument would lead to
absurd results. Crimes like mayhem, kidnapping and assault with intent to do great bodily harm,
defined under statutes using the word "person," could be committed by corporations but murder and
manslaughter could not. Id.
50. 149 Cal. App. at 468, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
51. See, e.g., State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530 (1961); State ex rel. Losey
v. Willard, 54 So. 2d 183 (1951); Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459
(1913). See generally Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1117 (1962). But see United States v. Van Schaick, 134
F. 592, 602 (1904) (although the statute prescribed only imprisonment, the court concluded that
Congress could not have intended to immunize a corporate violator; a "more reasonable alternative"
was that Congress inadvertently omitted to provide a suitable punishment for the offense when com-
mitted by a corporation).
52. See United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50 (1909). In Union Supply, the corpora-
tion was charged with violating a federal record keeping statute. The Court concluded that when a
statute prescribes two independent penalties, a court should inflict them as far as it can. The defend-
ant should not be allowed to escape merely because one of the penalties is impossible to impose. Id.
at 55.
53. See Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263, 268, 75 P. 924, 925-26 (1904) (con-
cluding that although the corporation cannot be imprisoned if the fine is not paid, the fine can still be
collected through the means provided for the collection of money judgments).
54. See Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 324, 153 S.W. 459, 461 (1913)
(noting that the punishment for the nonstatutory offense of involuntary manslaughter would be
either a fine, or imprisonment, or both. Typically, only the lesser degrees of homicide, such as
involuntary manslaughter, fall within the common law fine penalty. Id.
55. CAL. PENAL CODE §193 (Deering 1985).
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may impose a fine on a corporation convicted of "any crime punishable
by imprisonment. '5 6 Thus, under California law, inability to impose the
statutory punishment no longer stands as an obstacle to liability.
In sum, under the current state of the law a corporation could be made
amenable to prosecution for any degree of homicide. Until recently,
however, few corporations were prosecuted for manslaughter and corpo-
rate liability in intentional homicide cases is still virtually unknown.
Nevertheless, the recent increase in corporate homicide cases indicates
that prosecutors are looking for new ways to control corporate miscon-
duct, and they may find the criminal justice system the best solution.
II. POLICY
Of all factors a court considers in imposing criminal liability on corpo-
rations, public policy is the most compelling. Corporations, large and
small, are essential, pervasive elements of modem life. Unfortunately,
some corporate activity endangers life. Unsafe products present serious
risks to consumers, and hazardous working conditions threaten the
safety and health of corporate employees.57 Corporations, however, often
ignore such risks to maximize profits or minimize losses.5 8 Shortcutting
expensive safety precautions or responding forcibly to strikes can result
in substantial indirect economic benefits.59 Some courts have recognized
that the criminal law can and should be invoked to deter and correct the
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 672 (Deering 1985).
57. See Spurgeon & Fagan, Criminal Liability for Life-Endangering Corporate Conduct, 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 400, 400 (1981). Spurgeon & Fagan divide corporate life-endangering
activity into "three categories: occupational harm, dangers to consumers, and deterioration of the
environment affecting the general public." Id. at 402 (citing Schrager & Short, Toward a Sociology
of Organizational Crime, 25 Soc. PROB. 407 (1978)). One study estimates that "approximately 20
million Americans are injured each year in the home as a result of accidents involving unsafe con-
sumer products. These accidents result in about 30,000 deaths .... (citation omitted). In addition,
"federal health officials have estimated that 25% of the work force is exposed to regulated toxic
substances .... Spurgeon & Fagan, supra at 402.
58. But see Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 57, at 427 (Some commentators claim that estab-
lished corporations seek "longer range goals such as growth, increased market share and improved
social image," rather than profit maximization.) (citing M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE
CRIME 261 (1980)). This argument is undermined, however, by particular instances of corporate
conduct. For example, it is alleged that an internal Ford Motor Co. memorandum shows Ford knew
its Pinto fuel system was prone to explode in rear-end collisions, but decided not to make a safety
improvement costing only $11 per car. See Dowie, How Ford Put Two Million Firetraps on Wheels,
23 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 46 (1977).
59. Granite Construction Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 467, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
(Noting that crimes against persons can be directly linked to the profit motive).
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abuses of such corporate misconduct.'
A. Deterrence
A criminal prosecution has several detrimental effects on a corpora-
tion, and thus acts as a strong deterrent to corporate misconduct. Cor-
porations, like individuals, suffer from the stigma associated with a
criminal conviction.6 If the conviction stems from a work-related death,
as in the Film Recovery case, negative publicity may make it difficult for
the corporation to hire and maintain an adequate work force.62 If a con-
sumer death is caused by an unsafe product, the corporation may lose
current and potential customers. In either case, stockholders may lose
confidence in the corporation. Ensuing stock sales may cause stock
prices to plummet. The threat of these potentially devastating effects
provides a strong deterrent to future corporate misconduct.63 As the
number of homicide prosecutions increases, more and more corporations
will realize they are susceptible to the stigmatizing effects of the criminal
justice system. As a result, consumers and workers will benefit from cor-
porate unwillingness to take safety risks.
60. Id. See also New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495-96
(1909):
While the law should have regard to the rights of all, and to those of corporations no less
than to those of individuals, it cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the great majority of
business transactions in modem times are conducted through these bodies, and particularly
that interstate commerce is almost entirely in their hands, and to give them immunity from
all punishment because of the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit
a crime would virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-
matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.
61. Id. See Elkins, supra note 6, at 77-81; Elkins notes that the stigma of a criminal conviction
has more effect on an individual because he values his social standing in the community while a
corporation does not enjoy the same kind of social position. Nevertheless, a corporation does have
an "image" to maintain for its various "publics." Consumers, employees, stockholders, creditors,
suppliers and potential customers all have an interest in the corporation's image. Id. at 78. See also
Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 57, at 426. The response of the Ford Motor Co. to a reckless homi-
cide charge for the Pinto-related deaths of three girls demonstrates that corporations fear the effects
of a criminal conviction. Ford spent an estimated one million dollars in litigation expenses to defend
itself against a potential $30,000 fine. Id. (citing M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME
261 (1980)).
62. See Illinois v. Film Recovery Sys. supra note 1. In Film Recovery the workers did not speak
or read English and were not warned of the occupational dangers to which they were exposed.
Before the death of a co-worker, they probably were unaware of the risks. See text accompanying
supra notes 1-2. One can reasonably assume that if the workers were aware of the life threatening
conditions, many would not have continued working.
63. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW §5 at 22-23 (ex-
plaining general and particular deterrence).
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Criminal fines also act as a deterrent, albeit a weaker one, to corporate
misconduct. A corporation, motivated by profit, normally will not want
to risk losing a portion of its earnings through a fine. Yet, the economic
pressure of fines will not be effective if corporations determine that liabil-
ity is less expensive than the costs of avoiding it. For instance, a large
company incorporating potential fines in its cost-benefit analysis may find
criminal or civil penalties less costly than safety precautions.' Similarly,
a smaller corporation may be willing to risk liability because it can sim-
ply go out of business to avoid paying the fine.65 In either situation, how-
ever, solutions do exist.
Statutory provisions can be drawn to increase the deterrent effect of a
criminal fine. Homicide statutes can prescribe fines that are scaled to the
economic resources of an individual corporation.66 The Texas Penal
Code, for example, contains a corporate fine provision that is based on
the profits of each corporation.67 The more the corporation profits from
its misconduct, the greater the potential fine. Ultimately, such scaled
64. In 1972, Chevron Corp. paid a one million dollar fine for violation of pollution laws. This
fine represented only .03% of the gross income of Chevron's parent, Standard Oil of California.
Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 57, at 427. See also Elkins, supra note 6, at 81:
The criminal fine is often so small that criminal violations are economically more advanta-
geous than compliance. Thus, the fine has no deterrent effect. A fine of several thousand
dollars, while it might destroy a small business, is a negligible factor in the budget of Gen-
eral Motors, and hardly overcomes the lure of large profits or increased political power to
be gained from some forms of illegal activity.
65. Id. Cf Spiegel, supra note 1. Spiegel noted that "large civil fines ... may be a hollow
threat to a small firm willing to go out of business rather than pay a fine." Id. at 50. The Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration has not yet collected a civil fine assessed against Film Re-
covery Systems for health and safety violations. Id.
66. See Elkins, supra note 6, at 81-82 (also recommending an increase in statutory fines to
produce the maximum deterrent effect). See also Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 57, at 427.
Spurgeon & Fagan argued that "judges should have the option of adjusting the size of the fine to the
ability of the corporation to pay and to the magnitude of the harm caused." Id. This recommenda.
tion may not be as effective as a statutorily scaled fine, however, because courts are often lenient in
imposing fines on corporations. See Radin, Corporate Criminal Liability for Employee-Endangering
Activities, 18 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 39, 56 (1983); Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for
Homicide: Can the Criminal Law Control Corporate Behavior?, 38 Sw. L.J. 1275, 1286-87 (1985).
67. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.51 (Vernon Supp. 1986):
(b) If a corporation.., is adjudged guilty of an offense that provides a penalty including
imprisonment, or provides no specific penalty, a court may sentence the corporation. .. to
pay a fine in an amount fixed by the court, not to exceed:
(1) $20,000 if the offense is a felony of any category.
(c) In lieu ofthe fines authorized by... (b)(1)... if a court finds that the corporation ...
gained money or property or caused personal injury, property damage, or other loss
through the commission of a felony or... misdemeanor, the court may sentence the corpo-
ration.., to pay a fine in an amount fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount
gained or caused by the corporation to be lost, whichever is greater.
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fines will increase the economic pressure on a corporation to conform to
appropriate safety standards.
A small corporation willing to go out of business, however, will not be
affected by a scaled fine. Nevertheless, the criminal justice system can
prevent misconduct by small corporations through increased homicide
prosecutions against individual officers and agents.6" The officers of a
small corporation are often closely connected with the specific miscon-
duct which causes death.69 Consequently, it is easier for a prosecutor to
identify and gather evidence against the individuals involved.7 0 Finding
themselves more susceptible to individual prosecution, officers in small
corporations will be less inclined to cut corners on safety.
Finally, criminal fines may deter corporate misconduct because they
impose hardships on stockholders by increasing investment risks. De-
fendant corporations and commentators have argued unsuccessfully that
criminal fines ultimately punish innocent stockholders and deprive them
of property without due process of law.7 Stockholders also suffer when a
This construction presents two problems. First, it provides for judicial discretion. In a felony
conviction, the judge has the option to impose the $20,000 fine contained in § 12.51(b) or set as the
fine a discretionary amount as provided in § 12.51(a). This "option" allows the judge to be "lenient"
and thus, undermine the deterrent effect. See supra note 66. Second, a court may have difficulty
determining, in the case of a national corporation, the amount of profit made within the state. Com-
ment, supra note 66, at 1288. Any substantial difficulty may encourage the judge to impose the
$20,000 fine under §12.51(b). In the case of a large, national corporation, such a fine would be
neglibile. A mandatory scaled fine which removes the judicial "option," would be a better solution.
68. See Elkins, supra note 6, at 82-84. Elkins argues that the effectiveness of prosecuting indi-
viduals does not undermine the argument for corporate liability. Id. at 82. In a larger corporation,
however, the individuals responsible for the crimes benefitting the corporation are often difficult to
identify. "The size and structural diffusion of the modem corporation often masks 'individual' re-
sponsibility and makes it extremely difficult to investigate and successfully prosecute corporate-re-
lated crimes." Id. at 83. But see, eg., Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating
Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1375 (1979) (arguing that
criminal sanctions are effective only when applied to individuals).
69. See Elkins, supra note 6, at 83-84.
70. See Spiegel, supra note 1, at 50 (describing the Film Recovery case as a "prosecutor's
dream" because the negligence was dramatic and sustained and "the negligent parties . . . were
close-spatially and bureaucratically-to the workers"). Cf. Flynn, Criminal Sanctions Under State
and Federal Antitrust Laws, 45 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1305-06 (1967) ("The available statistics on
criminal antitrust prosecutions suggest that the smaller the corporate defendant, the easier it is to
impose criminal sanctions upon those responsible for the corporation's antitrust violation.").
71. See, e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,492 (1909);
Comment, Corporate Homicide, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 911 (1979).
Radin argues that shareholders are not the only "innocent" parties suffering the penalties of cor-
porate misconduct. The value of bondholders' securities may be diminished and other creditors'
accounts receivable will be at risk. Radin, supra note 66, at 53. Employees may be laid off under a
cost cutting campaign triggered by a severe fine. Id. In addition, consumers "will bear at least a
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corporation pays damages after a finding of civil liability or when corpo-
rate management makes a bad business decision. The resulting loss in
these situations is viewed as part of the investment risk assumed by
shareholders when they purchase stock. Similarly, a management deci-
sion which ultimately results in criminal liability and a corresponding
fine may be viewed as part of a stockholder's ordinary investment risk.72
B. Retribution & Incapacitation
A criminal homicide conviction against a corporation also fulfills a re-
tributive function. Punishing blameworthy conduct "serves to satisfy so-
cial passions for vengeance" which, in turn, deters individual attempts to
gain revenge.73 In addition, unpunished conduct leads to a general lack
of respect for the criminal justice system.74 To foster respect for all laws,
the state must be willing to prosecute corporations for homicides result-
ing from serious misconduct.
Homicide prosecutions also serve to incapacitate corporate wrongdo-
ers, at least temporarily. Small corporations, like Film Recovery Sys-
tems for example, may be forced out of business. 7' The possibility exists,
however, that such corporations may simply reform under a new corpo-
rate name and continue to engage in culpable conduct. The erection of
statutory barriers to reincorporation by owners and officers of convicted
portion of the criminal fine in the form of higher prices." Id. But see Elkins, supra note 6, at 82
(arguing that competition may make price increases impractical).
Radin proposes to solve this overspill problem by imposing fines payable in the equity securities of
the corporation rather than in cash. Radin, supra note 66, at 54 (citing Coffee, "No Soul to Damn:
No Body to Kick'" An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH.
L. REv. 386, 401 n.53 (1981)). The corporation would be ordered to issue shares, having a value
equal to a fine, to a fund benefitting the victims of the corporation's misconduct. The equity fine,
unlike a cash fine, will not deplete the capital of the corporation, so price raises and cost cutting
would be less likely to occur. Radin, supra note 66, at 54.
72. See Elkins, supra note 6, at 82 ("The law protects the shareholders with limited liability to
induce risk capital in the corporate enterprise, and the loss of profits due to corporate criminal fines
should be viewed as an investment risk."); Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 57, at 427-28 n. 137 (quot-
ing Gels, Deterring Corporate Crime, in THE CONSUMER AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 347
(R. Nader ed. 1973) ("purchase of corporate stock is always both an investment and a gamble; the
gamble is that the corporation will prosper by whatever tactics of management its chosen officers
pursue.").
73. See Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 57, at 412 (citing Fisse, The Social Policy of Corporate
Criminal Responsibility, 6 ADEL. L. REV. 361, 406 (1978)). See also W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra
note 63, at 24.
74. See Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 57, at 412.
75. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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corporations, 76 or the prosecution of officers engaged in culpable con-
duct,77 avoids this possibility.
In a sense, incapacitation of the product or condition that causes death
will also result from homicide prosecutions. Widespread publicity of the
prosecution will encourage store owners to remove unsafe products from
their shelves. The threat of prosecution may encourage manufacturers to
recall defective wares, remedy unsafe working conditions or close haz-
ardous plants.78
C. The Lack of Alternatives
Corporate homicide prosecutions are necessary to correct corporate
misconduct considering the inadequacy of currently available alterna-
fives. Civil actions, for example, do not generate the potentially devastat-
ing adverse publicity which is effective against a large corporation,7 9 and
civil damage awards are merely included in the corporation's cost-benefit
analysis.8" Effective regulatory procedures and fines are similarly lack-
ing. In contrast, the corporate fear of a homicide prosecution is vividly
illustrated in Granite Construction Company v. Superior Court."1 In
Granite Construction, the corporation argued that the appropriate rem-
edy for its misconduct was a fine under the Labor Code even though that
fine was greater than the maximum fine under the California Penal
Code. 2 Clearly, the corporation was more willing to suffer a greater fine
than the stigma of a manslaughter conviction. 3
76. Such a statute could prohibit an individual who has previously been an officer or controlling
shareholder of a corporation convicted of homicide or other serious criminal offense from serving in
a similar capacity in a subsequent corporation. The penalty for a violation could be the suspension
or revocation of corporate status.
77. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
78. See Spiegel, supra note I, at 48.
79. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
80 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
81. 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1983). See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying
text.
82. 149 Cal. App. 3d at 473, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 9. Under CAL. LAB. CODE § 6452 (Deering
1985), a corporation may be fined up to $20,000. Under CAL. PENAL CODE § 672 the maximum fine
was $5,000.
83. 149 Cal. App. 3d at 470 n.2, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 6 n.2. The court stated:
The inadequacy of the penalty provided by section 672 is a legislative problem irrelevant to
this case. The existence of a penalty applicable to corporations makes this prosecution
more than "waste motion." Regardless of the penalty, the corporation has reason to de-
fend itself against the charge, because of damage to its reputation, the standing of manage-
ment in the eyes of its shareholders, and the like.
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
982 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Prosecuting individual officers and agents rather than the corporation
is also an adequate alternative. Because decisionmakers in large corpora-
tions are usually thousands of miles from the effects of their decisions, it
is difficult to pinpoint the individuals most responsible for the death. The
diffusion in the decisionmaking process adds to the confusion . 4 Simi-
larly, the specific employees whose work resulted in a defective product
may be entirely unknown."5 Finally, juries are less willing to convict
individuals than corporations.8 6 The result may be corporate misconduct
which is not redressed.
The recent increase in criminal prosecutions 7 indicates society's de-
mand for the implementation of criminal sanctions against corporations.
Civil remedies and existing criminal sanctions against corporate officers
are not effective.8 Consequently, state legislatures should reevaluate
their homicide statutes and remove any limiting or ambiguous language
that would immunize a corporation from prosecution.
III. LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
To successfully prosecute a corporation, the state's homicide statutes
must expressly apply to corporations and be drawn to avoid potential
"loopholes." Each state penal code should contain an independent sec-
tion expressly providing that corporations may be convicted of criminal
offenses.89 This section should specifically designate the crimes for which
84. See supra notes 68-69.
85. See State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360 (1852):
It is said, again, that the individuals who concur in making the order or in doing the work
are individually responsible. And so is every servant or agent by whose agency a tort is
committed, but it has never been supposed that the principal is therefore exempt from
liability. On the contrary, the principle and the policy of the law has ever been to look to
the principal rather than to the mere agent; and in the case of corporations, it is the clear
dictate of sound law not only, but of public policy, to look rather to the corporation at
whose instance and for whose benefit the wrong is perpetrated, than to the individual direc-
tors by whose order the wrong was done, who may be entirely unknown, or to the laborers
by whom the work was performed, who, in a great majority of cases, would be alike un-
known and irresponsible.
Id. at 369.
86. See Radin, supra note 66, at 57-58; Comment, supra note 66, at 1289. In Fiin Recovery, the
individuals were convicted of murder and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. This conviction
indicates that the courts are less reluctant to convict individuals for corporate crime. The trial,
however, was before a judge, not ajury, and the evidence against the individuals was substantial. See
supra notes I and 71.
87. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.




a corporation should and should not be held accountable.9" Such a pro-
vision would leave no doubt that the legislature intended to hold a corpo-
ration liable for enumerated crimes.
Several statutory phrases and constructions should be avoided or used
with extreme care. If the homicide statutes contain the word "person,"
the term should be defined, in the homicide statute itself or in an in-
dependent section, to include corporations as well as human beings.9 1
This definition should not contain ambiguous phrases such as "unless the
context requires otherwise" because courts may use such language as evi-
dence of a legislative intent to exclude a corporation from prosecution.92
In addition, the homicide statute should not define the victim in terms
of the perpetrator, such as "the killing of one person by ... another."93
Courts could interpret "another" to mean a "second or additional mem-
ber of the same... class... referred to by the preceding words."94 Even
if "person" was defined to include a corporation, a court may reason that
the inability of a corporation to be a victim indicates the legislature did
not intend to make it capable of being the slayer.
California Penal Code section 192, providing that "[m]anslaughter is
the unlawful killing of a human being without malice"95 avoids many of
the ambiguity problems. Such a provision combined with an independ-
ent section providing that a corporation is liable for all criminal offenses,
would make it unlikely that a corporation could escape criminal
prosecution.96
90. For example, bigamy is a crime for which a corporation could not be convicted. See Muel-
ler, supra note 6, at 23.
91. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-15 (1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (Deering 1985).
92. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
93. See, eg., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1): "[a] person is guilty of criminal homicide if he
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being."
94. See, e.g., People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 107, 88 N.E. 22, 23. In that
case, the actual statutory language was "the killing of one human being by... another." Id.
95. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (Deering 1985).
96. An alternative approach could be patterned after ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a) (1985):
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if, in per-
forming the acts which cause the death:
(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or
knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to
that individual or another; or
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than voluntary manslaughter.
By using "person" when referring to the slayer, and "individual" when referring to the victim, the
statute clearly articulates that the slayer and the victim are not necessarily of the same class. The
word "person" is defined to include corporations. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-15 (1985). Under
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
984 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 64:967
The state penal code should also contain a suitable punishment for a
corporation. The punishment may include forfeiture of the corporate
charter, revocation of the certificate to do business in the state, or a
fine.97 An effective fine should be based on the pecuniary gain derived
from the offense.98 Finally, in commentary and legislative hearings, the
legislature should clearly express its intention to hold corporations liable
for all degrees of homicide.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because public interest in corporate criminal accountability has
grown, the number of corporate homicide prosecutions is increasing.
State legislatures should accommodate these new attitudes by making
the appropriate statutory changes. Such actions will enable courts to
protect the safety and well-being of the public and punish guilty corpora-
tions for their criminal wrongdoings.
Alana L. Helverson
this approach, a legislature could further ensure corporate accountability if the pronoun "he" is
defined to include the neuter. See Granite Construction Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d
465, 471-72, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3, 7-8. Interestingly, Film Recovery Systems was charged with involun-
tary manslaughter even though its officers were charged with murder. See supra note 1. The lan-
guage of the Illinois statute does not appear to warrant such disparate treatment.
97. See, eg., MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.04 (1962). To assure that the corporation's directors,
officers or stockholders do not merely reform under a new name, statutory provisions may be neces-
sary as an obstacle to reformation. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
98. See, eg., MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.03(5) (1962) (prescribing a fine "equal to double the
pecuniary gain derived from the offense"); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.51(b) (Vernon 1986). See
supra note 67 for a discussion of the Texas provision.
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